This paper investigates the effects of subsidies on the investment decisions of a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We use survey information on firms' subjective evaluations of the investment they would have undertaken without financing, finding that subsidies have limited effectiveness as a stimulus. Without subsidies, three-quarters of the firms financed would have made the same amount of investment at the same date; most of the remaining firms would have made the same amount of investment at a future date.
Introduction

1
The volume of State aid disbursed in the European Union is fairly substantial, amounting to 0.6 per cent of EU-15 GDP. Governments use it to pursue a number of objectives, such as furthering regional development, promoting R&D, or supporting SMEs. State aid is based on a belief that market failures are predominant and that therefore without aid the economy could not achieve socially desirable equilibrium. However, as State aid distorts competition and impacts on public finances, reducing its volume has become a pressing concern of the EU Commission.
2 The guidelines drawn up by the Commission indicate that before resorting to aid member states should make sure that it does effectively represent the most appropriate solution, and in particular that the amount is limited to what is necessary. Nonetheless, as Besley and Seabright (1999) have shown, it is hard to say whether this requirement is met as we know little about the effectiveness of State aid.
To shed some light on the question, our paper presents evidence on the effects of investment subsidies on the decisions of a sample of Italian manufacturing firms.
The extent to which investment incentives have an economic pay-off has been a major subject of economic research for decades (see, for instance, Hall and Jorgenson 1967 and King 1977 ). Yet, despite the voluminous literature, there is no agreement on the effectiveness of investment incentives (see Faulk 2002 , Gabe and Karybill 2002 , Harris and Trainor 2005 , and Lee 1996 . The main problem is that any evaluation of the effects of governmentsponsored projects raises the question of what would have happened without the subsidies. In other words, evaluating an incentive programme is a counterfactual exercise.
Counterfactual analyses generally employ evaluation methods (see, for instance, Angrist and Krueger 1999 and Blundell and Costa Dias 2000) . The challenge is to construct a valid control group, as neither the subsidised nor the non-subsidised firms can be regarded as random draws from the total population of firms. Overall, since selection bias is endemic, it is extremely difficult to choose an untreated group for which one can safely say there would be no difference in outcomes with respect to the treated counterparts without an aid programme (see also Lalonde 1986 ). Our paper follows a different route. As part of the Bank of Italy's 2005 Survey of Industrial and Service
Firms we asked the firms that had received subsidies to provide a counterfactual assessment of what their investment activity would have been, had they not been financed. Unlike evaluation methods, in our approach the evaluator is the recipient firm rather than the econometrician. 1 We thank Giovanni D'Alessio, Massimo Omiccioli and L. Federico Signorini for comments and suggestions and Christine Stone for editorial assistance. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the Bank of Italy. 2 However, in spite of pledges by member states at successive European Councils to reduce the overall volume of State aid, there is still no sign of a reduction (see EU Commission 2005).
Recipient firms seemed well-prepared for such an assessment because investment and its financing is a recurrent activity for which they have put in place accurate planning and budgeting
procedures. This contrasts with other types of counterfactual evaluation, such as that of a training programme, something that usually happens only once in a lifetime so that the trainee finds it hard to predict what he or she would have done otherwise. Moreover, recipient firms seemed to be quite willing to provide an assessment, there being a long tradition of collaboration between Italian industrial firms and the Bank of Italy for the collection of economic data. Firms know that the data are collected for the purpose of economic analysis only and that confidentiality is guaranteed. More importantly, the results show that with our approach strategic considerations in the answering process and social desirability do not affect the answers.
Our data are collected from questions designed to uncover whether the incentives made it possible to undertake investment that would not have been carried out otherwise. One of the first issues we have to tackle is that of selection. Recipient and non-recipient firms may differ in several respects. For instance, if subsidies go to the most efficient firms, then these might invest without aid as well. Another difficulty is time substitution: the availability of subsidies may persuade firms to bring forward projects originally planned for the future. A final consideration is that investment projects may only be profitable if they are subsidised. Thus, subsidised firms may take up investment opportunities that non-subsidised firms would have exploited if there had not been the incentives. However, lack of profitability could also be caused by factor inefficiency (because of the features of the award mechanisms, subsidised firms may undertake infra-marginal projects to improve their chances of getting aid) or local external diseconomies, which the incentive is intended to compensate.
The results show that according to the recipients' evaluation subsidies have limited effectiveness. Without them, 74 per cent of the recipient firms would have carried out exactly the same amount of investment, while 17 per cent would simply have postponed it. The investment was judged profitable only if subsidised by 7 per cent of recipient firms. Those deeming the investment profitable even if not subsidised, and therefore using subsidies to replace external financing (not available), represented as few as 2 per cent of the recipients.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a snapshot of public financial assistance to manufacturing in Italy. Section 3 explains the issues involved in evaluating effectiveness. Section 4 presents the evidence. Finally, in Section 5 we offer some conclusions. firms that have no incentive to invest despite the tax deduction self-select out of the pool of participants. In our case, therefore, selection is likely to bias the assessment upwards: if the money goes to the most efficient firms, then it should come as no surprise that these firms invest more since they would have invested more even without aid.
State aid to manufacturing
Another difficulty is time substitution. The availability of subsidies may prompt firms to bring forward projects originally planned for the future. As shown by Abel (1982) , a temporary investment subsidy gives firms a strong incentive to invest while the incentive is in effect (see also Auerbach and Hines 1988, and Adda and Cooper 2000) . With regard to Law 488, Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) show that time substitution considerably affects the investment pattern of the firms financed. In short, a potential effect of aid may be to boost investment during the period in which the aid programme is in place, at the cost of reducing investment subsequently. In this case, a positive effect of the subsidies is not a proof of additionality, as without aid the same investment would have been made in the future.
A final concern is that investment projects may only be profitable if they are subsidised.
This may be due to three factors. First, there could be displacement. Subsidised firms may take some of the investment opportunities that non-subsidised firms would have exploited otherwise. As
Harris and Trainor (2005) and Lee (1996) show, subsidised firms may crowd out non-subsidised firms on the assumption that the size of the market is fixed and cannot support any additional production. 6 Displacement implies that the project would not have been viable without the extra demand that the subsidised firms gain by crowding out competitors. In the case of displacement, a positive effect of the incentives is not a sign of additionality, as without aid the same investment would have been made by a different firm.
Second, incentives could drive factor inefficiency. To improve the chance of getting the subsidy, firms could move towards infra-marginal projects. For instance, firms applying for funds under Law 488 may choose to undertake more labour-intensive projects as the award scheme puts a premium on hiring. In the case of factor inefficiency, it will be not appropriate to interpret higher infra-marginal investment activity as evidence of the effectiveness of aid as these investments carry with them a wasteful component.
7
Third, the fact that the project is not profitable without aid could be due to negative external economies. For instance, firms applying for regional aid may choose to locate their investment in 6 Displacement may also occur because of general equilibrium effects. The aid may change the price of capital as a whole if it affects a substantial number of firms. For instance, Goolsbee (1998) shows that investment incentives have little impact because much of the benefit does not go so much to investing firms as to suppliers of capital through higher prices. 7 The fact that subsidised investments have lower productivity is a common theme in the literature on the effectiveness of regional aid in Italy (see, for instance, Galli and Onado 1990).
backward areas with less infrastructure and remote access to markets. In the case of external negative economies, subsidising projects with a lower market rate of return than projects located elsewhere could be exactly the intended outcome of the policy. 8 In other words, the subsidy compensates for local external diseconomies and makes investments in that area possible which would not have been carried out otherwise.
The evidence
We try to shed some light on the effectiveness of aid in stimulating investment by directly questioning entrepreneurs. This ensures that the subjective evaluation reflects the perception of a person with direct responsibility for the firm's decisions.
The reliability of the data we collect should be judged on two grounds: the firm's ability to provide a counterfactual evaluation and its willingness to tell the truth. (2004), the issue of social desirability is magnified when the evaluation is conducted by the same agency that provides the financing. This is not our case, as the Bank of Italy is not involved in allocating incentives to firms (see also Iarossi 2006) . 15 Our sample of 3,020 firms excludes those that did not answer this question (3 per cent of those interviewed). According to our checks, non-response was random according to the variables included in the survey design (size class, sector of activity and geographical location). 16 The location is that of the firm's head office. Many firms with head offices in the North and Centre have production units located in the South. Most of the state aid granted to those firms finances industrial projects in the Mezzogiorno. In 2005, for manufacturing firms with head offices in the North and Centre, the quotas of employees (5.4 per cent) and investment (12.3 per cent) located in the South of subsidised firms were between two and three times as large as the corresponding quotas of non subsidised firms. 17 Larger firms with 50 employees or more were asked to report the value of subsidised investment (the amount of aid received was instead reported by both large and small firms). For these firms we are able calculate the percentage of subsidised investment over aid. The ratio turns out to be slightly over 200 per cent: that is, on average €100 of investment benefited from €50 of subsidies. Note that providers of aid usually take the ratio of subsidised investment to aid to be an indicator of effectiveness. As we argue in this paper, however, this indicator is misleading as it does not account for investment that would have been made even without aid.
What share of investment would have been undertaken had the firm not been financed? As the first step in assessing additionality subsidised firms were requested to answer counterfactual question no. 1: The answers to this question provide us with a measure of the investment that would have been made without aid; however, this could still include investment driven purely by time substitution or projects not profitable without aid. To be sure, the presence of the incentives might also affect the decisions of a firm that would invest the same amount of money without aid. For instance, a firm that would carry out a given project may instead decide to undertake a different project, provided that it is adequately financed by the State. In this case, it is reasonable to think that without subsidies the different, non-subsidised project would have a higher rate of return. As for the assessment of additionality, however, an agnostic stance is needed here because we do not know the relative merits of displacement, factor inefficiency and local diseconomies (see Section 3 and the discussion below). To capture this possibility, firms that would have invested the same amount of money even without subsidies were requested to specify whether the money would have been invested in the same project (answer no. 1) or in projects at least partially different (answer no. 2).
Finally, firms that would have carried out less investment were asked to indicate the amount of the hypothetical investment expenditure (answers nos. 3 and 4).
18 2) without incentives it would have been better to postpone at least part of the firm's investments;
3) the investments would have been profitable in any case, but institutional financers (banks and other financial intermediaries, capital markets) would not have been willing to provide finance; 4) other (please, specify)."
Answer no. 1 allows for displacement, factor inefficiency, and local external diseconomies, as in all these cases without the subsidies the revenues from the project would have been lower than the costs.
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Answer no. 2 aims to capture time substitution effects, whereas answer no. 3 is directed at firms that use subsidies to finance fully profitable projects. In such a case, the lack of external funds prevents efficient investment from being carried out and therefore it is the case in which it appears safe to say that aid stimulates additional investment.
Finally, answer no. 4 seeks to capture any additional motives that we might have failed to account for.
Response frequencies to hypothetical question no. 2 are reported in Table A .4. 21 We find that time substitution is relevant: 22 64.2 per cent of the firms that would have invested less without subsidies declared that they would have postponed the investment (they represent 17 per cent of the 20 We are unable to distinguish among the three factors. However, as will be evident below, this is not particularly important since only 7 per cent of the recipient firms declare that lack of profitability is the reason behind their decision to invest less if not subsidised. 21 Two positive responses were allowed: multiple positive answers were suitably re-weighted to get frequencies totalling 100 across all choices. 22 Note that while it is hard to evaluate positively investment driven by time substitution on the grounds of efficiency, business-cycle smoothing may provide a reason why it could satisfy a policy-maker.
full sample of subsidised firms). We also discover that in 26.6 per cent of cases (7 per cent of the full sample) the project was deemed not profitable without aid. Finally, the results show that only for 8.5 per cent of firms that would have invested less if not subsidised (2 per cent of the full sample) was the lack of external funds the major hurdle to investing in profitable projects. 23 We also find that time substitution is more widespread among businesses located in the Centre and the North of the country, while lack of profitability and lack of external resources have more effect on southern companies. Finally, our results suggest that time substitution is more important for firms in traditional sectors, while the opposite holds true for lack of profitability. We then purge from the above notion of additional investment the share of firms that would have made the same amount of investment without incentives, but in different projects (line 2). This leaves the additional investment equal to 10.7 per cent of the subsidies (or 4.7 per cent of investment expenditure).
Subsequently, we consider non-additional the investment brought forward because of the existence of incentives. This leaves us with 1.3 per cent of the subsidies (or 2 per cent of the investment). 23 The fact that the lack of external resources is not a major impediment to investment is confirmed by the responses to the survey question on credit constraints (see Bank of Italy 2005). Only 3.2 per cent of manufacturing firms declared that lenders were not willing to increase the volume of loans to them. This share rises to barely 4 per cent for subsidised firms and equals 3 per cent for unsubsidised firms. 24 Additional investment is set equal to: (i) zero, for firms that would have invested the same amount without subsidies; (ii) total investment, for firms that would not have invested at all without subsidies; (iii) (1-x/100) * total investment, for firms that would have invested x per cent of their actual total investments without subsidies.
Finally, we take the most conservative notion of additionality and consider only investment by firms that would have invested less if not subsidised, because the banks or capital markets would not have been willing to finance even profitable projects. This amounts to 0.2 per cent of subsidies (0.2 per cent of total investment). The finding that aid seems to be comparatively more effective in the South and for larger firms remains largely confirmed.
Concluding remarks
Investment subsidies may distort competition and place a burden on public finance.
However, to the extent that they stimulate additional investment there could be a trade-off against desirable consequences. At the end of the day, it could be that less competition and an extra fiscal burden is an acceptable price to pay for spurring economic growth.
The problem with this is that assessing the effectiveness of subsidies to stimulate additional investment is a daunting task. When evaluating the effects of government-sponsored projects one has to answer the hypothetical question of what would have happened without the aid. A number of difficulties arise at this point. First, it could be that recipient firms would have invested the same amount of money even without aid. Second, the availability of public money could have provided an incentive to bring forward projects originally planned for the future or to undertake relatively inefficient projects. By collecting data explicitly designed to take these difficulties into account, we try to shed some light on the scale of the investment activity that the recipient firm would have undertaken had it not been financed. A certain amount of caution is required when generalising our results as the data are limited to a single year and are collected by asking a hypothetical question. Nonetheless, the findings indicate that envisaging a more effective way to use public money should be high on the agenda of policymakers as millions of euros' worth of financial resources support investment subsidies. They also suggest that leaving these resources with the private sector by means of lower taxation is an option that should not be overlooked.
Appendix A. Statistical tables (a) Location of the firm's head office. -(b) "Small" denotes firms with 20-49 employees and "Large" denotes firms with 50 employees or more. -(c) "Traditional" includes the following industries: textiles, clothing, leather, shoes, food, furniture, and paper; "Other" includes other manufacturing firms. -(d) Significance of the difference between the two means (* = p-value between 0.05 and 0.10; ** = p-value between 0.01 and 0.05; *** = p-value lower than 0.01). 
